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Ethridge: Workmen's Compensation: The Cumulative Injury Doctrine

STUDENT NOTES
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION: THE
CUMULATIVE INJURY DOCTRINE
I.

INTRODUCTION

Until 1976, the West Virginia Supreme Court rigidly adhered
to the judicially derived rule that to be compensable under the
workmen's compensation provisions of the West Virginia Code' an
industrial injury had to arise from an isolated, fortuitous event.
This rule resulted in the denial of workmen's compensation claims
which failed to allege a particular accident or accidental result as
W. VA. CODE § 23-4-1 (1978 Replacement Vol.), which reads in relevant part:
. . . the commissioner shall disburse the workmen's compensation fund
to the employees of employers subject to this chapter, which employees
have received personal injuries in the course of and resulting from their
covered employment or to the dependents, if any, of such employees in
case death has ensued, according to the provisions hereinafter made; and
also for the expenses of the administration of this chapter, as provided
in section two [§ 23-1-2], article one of this chapter ...
For the purposes of this chapter, occupational disease means a disease incurred in the course of and resulting from employment. No ordinary disease of life to which the general public is exposed outside of the
employment shall be compensable except when it follows as an incident
of occupational disease as defined in this chapter. Except in the case of
occupational pneumoconiosis, a disease shall be deemed to have been
incurred in the course of or to have resulted from the employment only if
it is apparent to the rational mind, upon consideration of all the circumstances (1) that there is a direct causal connection between the conditions
under which work is performed and the occupational disease, (2) that it
can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work as a result
of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment, (3) that it
can be fairly traced to the employment as the proximate cause, (4) that
it does not come from a hazard to which workmen would have been
equally exposed outside of the employment, (5) that it is incidental to the
character of the business and not independent of the relation of employer
and employee, and (6) that it must appear to have had its origin in a risk
connected with the employment and to have flowed from that source as
a natural consequence, though it need not have been foreseen or expected
before its contraction.
No award shall be made under the provisions of this chapter for any
occupational disease contracted prior to the first day of July, one thousand nine hundred forty-nine. An employee shall be deemed to have
contracted an occupational disease within the meaning of this paragraph
if the disease or condition has developed to such an extent that it can be
diagnosed as an occupational disease. . ...
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the event producing injury.2 In 1976, however, the court, in Lilly
v. Workmen's Compensation Commissioner,' made a significant
move away from the injury-by-accident rule by accepting as compensable a concept of industrial injury known as cumulative injury.4 Cumulative injury, as the term implies, takes as its premise
the hypothesis that a series of microtraumatic injuries can be just
as debilitating, when added together, as an injury caused by an
isolated, fortuitous accident.
The development in West Virginia of the concept of cumulative injury as a compensable injury was made possible by the liberal coverage provisions of the West Virginia Code, which includes,
within the definition of personal injury, occupational diseases causally related to employment.5 If a disability or disease can meet all
six tests for occupational diseases as set out in the basic coverage
provision, it is considered compensable as a personal injury.' The
court in Lilly seized upon the occupational disease criteria to effect
a change in the injury-by-accident test for compensability without
overtly disturbing years of case law based upon that test.
Lilly involved an employee whose regular duties required the
sewing of garments which were put into 25-pound bundles. The
lifting of these bundles, coupled with a twisting motion of the
employee's body from four to ten times an hour over a seven-month
period, resulted in lower back pain which prohibited the employee
from continuing the job.7 The court found that the employee's
injuries satisfied the occupational disease requirements of the
West Virginia Code and therefore were compensable as a personal
injury." In language characteristic of cumulative injury holdings in
other jurisdictions, the court held that an "employee who is injured
gradually by reasons of the duties of employment. . . is no less
the recipient of a personal injury than one who suffers a single
disabling trauma." 9 Because this premise constitutes a significant
departure from decisions based upon the injury-by-accident test,
the implications for the compensation system are vast. In addition
Barnett v. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 153 W. Va. 796, 172 S.E.2d 698 (1970).
225 S.E.2d 214 (W. Va. 1976).
1 Cumulative injuries are referred to in 1B LARSON, WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION
LAw § 39.00 (7th ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as LAnoN], under the heading "Gradual Injury."
W. VA. CODE § 23-4-1 (1978 Replacement Vol.), see note 1, supra.
'Id.
7 225 S.E.2d at 215.
2

Id. at 217.
IId. at 218.
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to cumulative injury, other injuries previously considered noncompensable under the old test, such as certain types of psychological
disabilities, may attain a compensable status under the Lilly holding. The major implications of Lilly are best examined by a comparison of the principles of cumulative injury with the origin and
purpose of the injury-by-accident rule which Lilly impliedly overrules.
11.

HISTORY OF THE INJURY-BY-ACCIDENT RULE

The West Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act,'5 like most
other compensation acts of its generation, was inspired by the
English Compensation Law of 1897," which required an injury by
accident.'2 The injury-by-accident requirement in the English act
was primarily a response to the replacement of common law tort
remedies with workmen's compensation provisions. The latter required no showing of negligence before recovery would lie.' 3 As the
new workmen's compensation system was not designed to promote
strict liability'4 of employers, however, its substitution for negligence necessitated the development of some type of work connection test that would replace proximate cause'- but still limit recovery in some instances. While not intended to be as limiting as the
proximate cause test, the injury-by-accident test did effectively
limit compensability to those injuries which could readily be connected to employment. 8 Since occupational diseases were never
contemplated as compensable under the English act'7 (most probably because their prevalence was little recognized at common law),
the requirement of injury by accident posed no inherent conflicts
when used as a work connection test. 8 Thus, the new workmen's
compensation system effectively eliminated the uncertainties of
tort litigation and the proximate cause test and substantially
broadened employers' liability for industrial accidents'" while still
10W. VA. CODE §§ 23-1-1 to -6-1 (1978 Replacement Vol.).
" 1 Q.B. c. 37 § 1 (1897).
12 Archibald v. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 77 W. Va. 448, 450, 87 S.E. 791,
792 (1916).
'1 1 LmAsON, supra note 4, § 1.20.
14Id. § 2.20.
IsId. § 2.10.
" Id.
11B LAnSON, supra note 4, § 41.20.
" For a discussion of the work connection test see 1A LARSON, supra note 4, §
20.00.
" 1 LARSON, supra note 4, § 2.10.
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somewhat limiting the scope of compensable injuries through the
workings of the injury-by-accident rule.
The various state adoptions of workmen's compensation laws
required the courts to interpret the legislative intent as to the
injury-by-accident rule in various coverage provisions. While the
enactments in some states spoke directly to the requirement of
injury by accident, 0 others did not, and the courts were necessarily
left with the choice of whether or not to apply this doctrine. West
Virginia, as Professor Larson notes, is one of a handful of jurisdictions whose basic coverage provisions contain no reference to the
requirement of injury by accident.2 Other jurisdictions, most notably Ohio,2" Michigan,n and Massachusetts,24 when first faced with
the problem of interpreting coverage provisions similar to West
Virginia's, took varying approaches. The courts in Michigan and
Ohio chose to "read in" the requirement of injury by accident from
other sections of the act.2 The Massachusetts court, however, held
that the legislature intentionally chose not to include the injuryby-accident rule, taking into account the obvious fact that the
legislature had had a copy of the English act before it when drafting the provision.28 The effect of this Massachusetts holding was
to allow compensation for occupational diseases and injuries when
the disease or injury arose out of and in the course of employment 7
The West Virginia court, along with many others, did not
utilize the same reasoning as the Massachusetts court. The result
was that the West Virginia court gave birth to the requirement of
21

lB LAnsON, supra note 4, § 37.10.

21

Id.

Indus. Comm'n v. Brown, 92 Ohio St. 309, 110 N.E. 744 (1915).
" Adams v. Acme White Lead Works, 182 Mich. 157, 148 N.W. 485 (1914).
24 In re Maddens Case, 222 Mass. 487, 111 N.E. 379 (1916).
2 Both Brown and Adams are illustrative of the rather draconian interpretation given to the coverage provisions. The court in Brown justified its reading in of
the injury-by-accident requirement by noting that if occupational diseases were
compensable, insurance rates would soar. The Michigan court noted that since
occupational diseases were not compensable at common law, they should not be
compensable under the act. This clearly ignores the principle that workmen's compensation is designed to remove common law tort concepts from the workplace.
While the Michigan court has since redeemed.itself, in Sheppard v. Michigan Nat'l
Bank, 348 Mich. 577, 83 N.W.2d 614 (1957), the Ohio court maintained the injuryby-accident test in Bowman v. Nat'l Graphics Corp., 55 Ohio St. 2d 222,378 N.E.2d
1056 (1978).
21 In re Madden's Case, 222 Mass. 487, 489, 111 N.E. 379, 380 (1916).
2 Id. at 495, 111 N.E. at 383.
22
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injury-by-accident as a work connection test designed to limit the
types of compensable injuries. 28
This appears to be the posture maintained in the court's 1933

decision of Jones v. Rinehart & Dennis Co. 21 Jones held that an

employee could not recover under workmen's compensation for
silicosis unless he could prove that his disability resulted from an
isolated, specific event.2 The court did hold that the claimant
could recover at common law if he could prove that his disability
resulted from the employer's negligence2 As Larson notes, however, the concept of negligence as it related to occupational disease
at the time of the Jones decision was premised primarily on the
difference between "normal conditions of the industry as distinguished from the negligence of the employer. '3 In other words, it
was generally not considered negligent to allow an employee to
work in an unhealthy environment if this environment was a normal condition of the industry.n The following quote from Jones is
illustrative:
[Sluch [common law] right of action does not exist in the
employee merely because he has contracted disease as an incident of his employment, in the absence of a showing of negligence on the part of his employer, because such disease may
arise in spite of due care of the employer to prevent its being
contracted by the employee. In such circumstances it becomes
a risk of employment .... 3
2 Martin v. Compensation Comm'r, 107 W. Va. 583, 149 S.E. 824 (1929).
Although Archibald v. Compensation Comm'r, 77 W. Va. 448, 87 S.E. 791 (1916),
is often cited as the case adopting the injury-by-accident rule, a closer reading of
the case seems to indicate that the court never intended to embrace the rule. In
Archibald, the term "accident" is merely used to describe the event leading to the
claimant's death and, in this respect, is employed for semantic convenience rather
than doctrinal development. The court goes to great lengths to discuss the exclusionary provision of the compensation act, and in so doing, notes that the rules of
statutory construction prohibit courts from reading in exclusions where the legislature has already spoken. As West Virginia's basic coverage provisions do not require
an injury by accident, yet set out other exclusions, it appears improbable that the
court would violate its own sanctions by reading in an exclusionary device such as
injury by accident.
" 113 W. Va. 414, 168 S.E. 482 (1933).
Id. at 423, 168 S.E. at 486.
' Id. at 425, 168 S.E. at 487. Subsequently, silicosis was made compensable
under a special enactment. Act of March 8, 1935, ch. 79, 1935 W. Va. Acts 345.
" 1B LARSON, supra note 4, § 41.20.
33Id.
31

113 W. Va. 414, 419, 168 S.E. 482, 485 (1933).
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There is some difficulty in aligning this reasoning with the
purposes of workmen's compensation. To recover in workmen's
compensation for a traumatic injury, the employee need not show
that he acted with due care.5 In fact, his negligent acts may be the
sole cause of his injury, and the employer may have taken every
possible precaution to prevent the injury. Nonetheless, the employer must compensate the employee if the injury is sustained in
the course of and resulting from employment. 6 The court's requirement in Jones that the employee go beyond workmen's compensation standards and prove negligence to recover for occupational
diseases arising out of employment creates an artificial distinction
based on the nature of the injury rather than its causative factors.
Thus, in the case of a traumatic injury, the employer's due care is
irrelevant. Yet in the case of an occupational disease it is the
central dispute, even though both the traumatic injury and the
occupational disease arose out of and in the course of employment.
The distinction appears to have been motivated by the desire to
limit the types of injuries considered compensable and, as Larson
suggests, prompted by economic considerations. Not the least of
these economic considerations was the reaction of insurers upon
certain occupational diseases were in
discovering how widespread
37
some industries.
The practical result of this artificial distinction was to preclude recovery in those instances when the employee could not
point to an isolated, fortuitous event as the cause of his disability.
Such was the case in the decision of Cashman v. Sims. 38 Cashman
was a physician employed at a tuberculosis sanitarium. Just prior
to his employment, he received a physical examination which revealed no signs of the existence of tubercular bacilli. During his
employment, he contracted tuberculosis and sought recovery from
workmen's compensation as well as through a special legislative
enactment." The court held that a disease must be attributable to
a specific and definite event arising in the course of and resulting
from employment and that a disease contracted over a period of
time was not compensable. 0 Had Cashman been able to establish
that the disease was transmitted by a particular patient at a par1 LAR ON, supra note 4, § 2.10.
W. VA. CODE § 23-4-1 (1978 Replacement Vol.), see note 1 supra.
1B LARSON, supra note 4, § 41.20.
130 W. Va. 430, 43 S.E.2d 805 (1947).
' Act of March 8, 1947, ch. 24, 1947 W.Va. Acts 97.
40 130 W. Va. 430, 446, 43 S.E.2d 805, 816 (1947).
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ticular time, he most probably would have recovered. The test in
Cashman was not related to the cause of the disease or its point of
origin. Rather, it was based on a concept of time and event that
precluded recovery, as the court noted, by a most deserving claimant.
The injury-by-accident requirement has been modified in
most jurisdictions to include situations where the event producing
the injury is not accidental or fortuitous but the result is.4' The
West Virginia court followed this newer accidental result rule in
Pennington v. Workmen's Compensation Commissioner.2 In
Pennington, the court held that although the claimant was performing his normal duties of shoveling coal when he felt back pain
and that there was no accident in the traditional sense of the word,
the occurrence of pain at a given point in time satisfied the isolated, fortuitous occurrence test for compensability 3
Under either test, injury-by-accident or accident by result,
the determinative factor is the ability of the employee to isolate
some event upon which to rest his claim. The extent to which some
claimants have gone to establish a point in time upon which to rest
their claims often borders on the extreme. In Jordanv. Workman's
Compensation Commissioner," a claimant with a pre-existing
back disability attempted to establish that his disability was aggravated by his employment. To fit within the injury-by-accident
test or the accidental result test, the claimant alleged three different versions of his "accident." 4 The supreme court affirmed a
finding by the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board that the
claimant's allegations were contradictory and that he had failed to
sustain his burden of proof.6 While the facts of Jordon are not
particularly compelling for compensation, the case does indicate
an awareness by the claimant's attorney that it was necessary to
allege an event upon which to rest his claim. The court in Lilly
impliedly recognized this prol~lem when it noted that the claimant
was told by her doctor's nurse that she would have to indicate a
11B LARSON, supra note 4, § 38.20.
222 S.E.2d 579 (1976). Although Pennington can be regarded as dealing a
strong blow to the injury-by-accident rule, its accidental result analysis indicates
that the court had still not freed itself from the constraints of an events related test.
11 Id. at 582.
" 156 W. Va. 199, 191 S.E.2d 497 (1972).
'
Id. at 161, 191 S.E.2d at 498.
" Id. at 167, 191 S.E.2d at 502.
2
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specific date of injury if her claim for compensation were to be
successful."
H.

Lilly v. Workmen's Compensation Commissioner

The Lilly case brought to the court's attention in a very clear
way many of the problems inherent in employing a work connection test based upon the injury-by-accident rule or the accidental
result rule. The court in Lilly was faced with an injury which,
according to medical evaluation, arose out of and in the course of
employment. The nature of the injury, however, did not lend itself
to an analysis for compensability based on either the injury-byaccident test or the accidental result test. The claimant's back
problems arose gradually from repeated microtraumatic occurrences impossible to consider as arising out of an isolated event.
Additionally, the manifestation of the disability was not so sudden
as to satisfy the accidental result test. Under either of these judicially derived tests, the employee's claim for compensation would
have to fail, although the medical evidence pointed to employment
as the causative element. 8 Confronted with such a fact situation,
the court could not, in justice to the employee and the compensation system, deny the claim. To accept the claim as satisfying one
of the accidental event tests would have required the court to
create a legal fiction which would have added greatly to the confusion already surrounding the accidental event tests. The only remaining approach the court could take was to evaluate the claim
under the occupational disease provision of the West Virginia
Code. 9 Claimant's counsel, upon realizing that he could not support the claim under either test, requested the appeals board to
consider the claim as an occupational disease, but the board ignored the request and denied the claim. The board's refusal to
consider this approach to the claim constituted the grounds for
appeal. 0 Noting that the compensability of a back injury as an
occupational disease was a question novel to this jurisdiction, the
court analyzed the claim under the six basic requirements for occupational diseases and held that:

[Tihe back injury suffered by the claimant .

. . occurred in
the course of and as a result of her employment; that there is a

,7 225 S.E.2d 214, 215 (W. Va. 1976).
U Id. at 216.
9 W. VA. CoD § 23-4-1 (1978 Replacement Vol.), see note 1, supra.
225 S.E.2d at 215.
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direct causal connection between the conditions under which
her work was performed and the occupational disease; that her
back condition can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of her work; and that it can be fairly traced to the employment as the proximate cause. To hold otherwise would operate
to defeat certain valid claims merely because there was no ascertainable, single, isolated fortuitous event which caused the
5

injury.

1

This clear and unequivocal rejection of the isolated fortuitous
event tests allowed the court to serve the ends of the compensation
system without impairing its own credibility by resorting to a
strained construction of the old tests to find the claim compensable.52 In support of its novel construction of the occupational disease provisions of the state code,53 the court relied on a California
case, Fruehauf v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board,51
which also held that a series of microtraumatic injuries to an employee's back which resulted in disability constituted an occupational disease within the provision of that state's code.5 Importantly, the California court noted that the injury would not have
been compensable as a personal injury under the statute. "8 The
court in Lilly also found support in Montgomery v. State Compensation Commissioner,5" a 1935 case holding that one who has suffered shock, exhaustion, and other conditions not of a traumatic
origin but rather resulting from being lost in a mine for seven days
has received a personal injury,58 compensable under the West Virginia Code. 9
Jurisdictions other than California have also considered the
theory of cumulative injury. A 1951 Michigan case, 0 which the
'

Id. at 217-18.

One device used by some courts to get around the constraints of the injury-

by-accident rule is the "repeated impact" theory. 1B

LASON,

supra note 4,

§ 39.40. The theory, however, seems to elevate form over substance. Each impact
is treated as an accident for purposes of the rule. As each impact alone creates no
perceptible deterioration, each impact individually would not result in compensability. It is only in their cumulative effect (hence the term cumulative injury) that
these impacts may be compensated.
W. VA. CODE § 23-4-1 (1978 Replacement Vol.), see note 1, supra.
' 68 Cal. 2d 569, 440 P.2d 236, 68 Cal. Rptr. 164 (1968).
CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 5405, 5411-12 (Deering 1976).
68 Cal. 2d at 572, 440 P.2d at 238, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 166.
' 116 W. Va. 44, 178 S.E. 425 (1935).
"Id.
" W. VA. CODE § 23-4-1 (1978 Replacement Vol.), see note 1, supra.
" Underwood v. Nat'l Motor Castings Div., 329 Mich. 273, 45 N.W.2d 286
(1951).
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California court and the West Virginia court recognized as persuasive, held that a repeated series of strains associated with employment was compensable as an occupational disease. However, only
a few months previous to that decision, the Michigan court had
held that repeated strains associated with employment were noncompensable.8 '
Although most jurisdictions confronting the compensability of
cumulative injury claims have reached a remarkable variety of
stances on the issue, those which have ruled in the affirmative
faced and will continue to face a more refined question. The question, as Larson notes, is no longer one based upon the difference
between occupational disease versus accidental injury, because
compensability lies on both sides of that line. Rather, the problem
under most tests is "separating occupational disease from diseases
that are neither accidental or occupational but common to mankind and not distinctively associated with employment." 2 This
problem has arisen in West Virginia, as the case of Myers v. Workmen's Compensation Commissioner3 suggests. In Myers, a 59year-old claimant sustained a hearing loss as a result of 30 years'
experience in the underground mining business. The appeals
board, in reversing a finding of compensability by the commissioner, accepted the evidence presented by the employer, which
indicated that "the most common cause of this type of hearing loss
is degeneration from advancing years."" The supreme court, in
reversing the finding of the appeals board, held that the claimant
did not have to "prove to the exclusion of all else, the causal
connection between the injury and the employment."" The evidence presented by the claimant set forth the fact that he had been
exposed to loud noises from such mining tools as roof bolters and
dynamite shooters and that he had suffered a medically documentable hearing loss which was of the type normally found in workers
exposed to excessive industrial noise. The liberal construction rule
for workmen's compensation is, of course, operative in West Virginia and was applied in the Myers case to "give the claimant the
86
benefit of all reasonable inferences."
1, Carter v. Int'l Detrola Corp., 328 Mich. 367, 43 N.W.2d 890 (1950).
62 1B LARSON, supra note 4, § 41.32.
63 239 S.E.2d 124 (W. Va. 1977).
"
"
"

Id. at 125.
Id. at 127.
Id. at 126.
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IV.

WHAT NEXT?

Although Lilly provided the court with an excellent opportunity to employ the occupational disease provisions to support a
cumulative injury claim, the interpretation of those provisions to
support other types of injuries not historically compensable is a
subject ripe for speculation. Perhaps the most controversial area
concerns claims based on mental and nervous injuries. Larson suggests that these types of injuries can be delineated into three categories: (1) mental stimulus causing physical injury; (2) physical
trauma causing nervous injury; and (3) mental stimulus causing
nervous injury.67
Cases involving mentally stimulated physical injury have generally been considered compensable by a majority of jurisdictions. 8 The easiest cases usually involve a sudden event such as a
scare, a loud noise, or a near-accident which results in a direct
physical impairment.69 In these situations, the event is fortuitous,
and the result is certain; thus the elements of the old tests are
satisfied. However, a more difficult situation arises when the
events leading up to the physical injury occur over a protracted
period of time. Under the injury-by-accident test, compensability
would be denied. Under the test of injury by accidental result,
compensability would probably lie if the disability occurred at an
ascertainable time and can be linked to employment. Thus, in the
much cited case of Klimas v. Trans-CaribbeanAirways, Inc.,70
compensation was awarded to the dependents of an executive who,
under extreme pressure to meet a project deadline, suffered a fatal
heart attack upon learning that the cost of the project exceeded his
budget and the deadline could not be met.
Cases falling in the second category, physical injury causing
nervous injury, are usually compensable to the extent of the physical disability and the resulting neurosis.71 Under the injury-byaccident test, the requirements of an isolated, fortuitous event are
satisfied by the initial physical trauma, and it is only a matter of

67Larson, Mental and Nervous Injury in Workmen's Compensation,23 VAND.
L. Rav. 1243 (1970).
"Id. at 1244.
" Id. at 1245.
' 10 N.Y.2d 209, 176 N.E.2d 714, 219 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1961); rev'g 12 App. Div.
2d 551, 207 N.Y.S. 72 (1960).
71Larson, Mental and Nervous Injury in Workmen's Compensation, 23 VAND.
L. REv. 1243.
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extending the-recovery to the resulting neurosis. The West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals, when confronted with a claimant alleging a nervous injury as the result of a physical injury, has allowed
compensation for both the physical injury and the resulting neu2 the
rosis. In Bare v. Workmen's Compensation Commissioner,"
court allowed the claimant to recover permanent total disability
benefits for the effects of a physical disability caused by a slate fall
and the resulting nervous injury. Judge Haymond, writing for the
court, held:
Upon the undisputed evidence that the mental and emotional
condition of the claimant amount to total permanent disability
and that such condition resulte.d from the injuries sustained by
the claimant ...

the commissioner was fully justified in con-

sidering the mental and emotional condition of the claimant in
granting the claimant a total permanent disability award."3
The court approved the method of extending the recovery to
include the resulting mental disability when the origin of the combined disabilities could be traced to ani isolated, fortuitous occurrence.
In Sisk v. Workmen's Compensation Commissioner,4 the
court, confronted with facts similar to Bare, granted a total permanent disability award to a claimant who was struck on the head
by a piece of slate and suffered a mental as well as a physical
disability. Again, the court applied the same principle of extending
the recovery to include the mental disability when the mental
disability was precipitated by a physical trauma. The principle
was also applied in Ward v. Workmen's Compensation
Commissioner7" and Harper v. Workmen's Compensation
Commissioner.76 In both Ward and Harper, an initial physical
trauma precipitated the mental disability, making the claims compensable.
According to Larson, there is almost no limit to the variety of
disabling mental conditions which have been deemed compensable.7 7 In one case, the claimant was bitten by a cat and developed
7
a psychoneurotic fear of rabies for which he was compensated. 1 It
148 W. Va. 760, 137 S.E.2d 435 (1964).
148 W. Va. at 768, 137 S.E.2d at 440.
" 153 W. Va. 461, 170 S.E.2d 20 (1969).
75154 W. Va. 454, 176 S.E.2d 592 (1970).
71234 S.E.2d 779 (W. Va. 1977).
7 1B LARsON, supra note 4, § 42.22.
"I Kalikoff v. Lucas & Co., 271 App. Div. 942, 67 N.Y.S.2d 153 (1947); affl'd,
72
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appears, then, that even under the restrictive injury-by-accident
or accident-by-result tests, compensability will lie in cases involving mental stimulus resulting in an ascertainable physical disability and in cases when a physical trauma results in a mental disability. In both of these circumstances, the event tests are satisfied by
either the accident, the result, or both.
The more difficult cases, however, and the ones in which the
Lilly definition of occupational disease and personal injury may
have the greatest impact, are those cases in Larson's third category-mental stimulus resulting in a nervous disability. A 1960
Michigan decision, Carter v. General Motors Corp.,"9 involved an
assembly line worker who could not keep up with the line and was
subjected to repeated criticism from his foreman. Although the
claimant was diagnosed as being susceptible to paranoid schizophrenia (he repeatedly went AWOL while in the Army), the court
found that "[t]he case at bar involves a series of mental stimuli
or events [the pressure of his job and the pressure of his foreman]
which caused an injury or disability. . .[and that] Carter's disabling psychosis resulted from emotional pressures encountered
by him daily in his work."80 Interestingly, the Michigan court,
when surveying other jurisdictions, cited with approval the West
Virginia case of Montgomery v. Workmen's Compensation
Commissioner,"'which held that an employee who suffered shock
and exhaustion as a result of being lost in a mine for seven days
was entitled to compensation. The Michigan court in Cartercited
Montgomery for the proposition that shock and exhaustion, although injuries related to the nervous system, were compensable
even without a finding of a physical trauma.2 The Montgomery
case was also cited in Lilly but for a different purpose. The court
in Lilly cited Montgomery to support the proposition that an injury does not have to be related to an isolated, fortuitous event.M
Although the court in Montgomery did state that the seven days
lost in the mine constituted a specific event, 4 the Montgomery
holding is more properly explained by the Lilly interpretation. The
Montgomery rationale was an attempt by the court to remain con297 N.Y. 663, 76 N.E.2d 324 (1947).
11 361 Mich. 577, 106 N.W.2d 105 (1960).
361 Mich. at 593, 106 N.W.2d at 113.
" 116 W. Va. 44, 178 S.E. 425 (1935).
361 Mich. at 588, 106 N.W.2d at 110.
225 S.E.2d 214, 217 (W. Va. 1976).
" 116 W. Va. 44, 45, 178 S.E. 425, 426 (1935).
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sistent with the injury-by-accident test in the face of a fact situation which could not reasonably be categorized as a specific, isolated event. The Lilly decision properly addressed what the
Montgomery court presumed in its holding but failed to state
boldly-the proposition that injuries can take place over a period
of time.
This proposition, as stated in Lilly, coupled with the Michigan
court's interpretation that Montgomery stands as authority for the
compensability of nervous disorders not precipitated by a physical
trauma, makes Montgomery a historically reasonable precedent
for the compensability of nervous disorders resulting from gradually induced mental stimuli-a kind of cumulative mental injury.
Larson notes that the compensation of mentally stimulated nervous injuries is a medically and legally sound proposition, "since
there is no valid distinction between physical and 'nervous' injuries." ' Historically, the excuse for not compensating such disability rested upon evidentiary problems. With the advance of medical
science, however, the excuse no longer exists. 6 Simply because a
disability manifests itself as a nervous disorder is no reason to deny
compensation when it can be shown that the disability arose out
of and in the course of employment. The nerves and the brain are
as much a part of the human organism as an arm or a leg, and to
deny compensation because the disability is nerve-related rather
than limb-related is illogical." It is equally as illogical to say that
nerve disorders must either result from a physical trauma or manifest themselves in a purely physical result. If a claimant can show
that a visible physical disability resulted from a series of microtraumatic injuries, as was shown in Lilly, there should be no reason
to prevent a claimant from showing that a series of microtraumatic
psychological injuries resulted in a medically verifiable nervous
injury. With several West Virginia cases standing for the compensability of nervous disorders in certain circumstances, and Lilly
standing for the proposition that injuries can occur over a protracted period of time, the West Virginia court has manifested the
willingness to compensate, in the proper fact situation, a mentally
stimulated psychological disability.
Undoubtedly, the Lilly decision provides the court with a powerful tool for finding compensable any workmen's compensation
1B LARSON, supra note 4, § 42.23.
"Id.
87Id.
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claim based upon cumulative injury or mentally stimulated nervous disorders. That cumulative injury claims may now be compensated in West Virginia appears clear in light of the Lilly holding.
By acknowledging that industrial injuries can occur over a protracted period of time, Lilly also creates a bridge over which the
court may cross the gorge of case law holding that nervous disorders must be linked to a physically traumatic occurrence before
compensability will lie. Before fully developing the case law for
cumulative injuries and mentally stimulated nervous disorders,
however, some very fundamental questions must be confronted,
not the least important of which is the purpose of the compensation system.
V.

THE CALIFORNIA EXPERIENCE

While it is the law in West Virginia that an employee may
receive compensation although he continues to work,88 it is universally acknowledged that the purpose of compensation is to remunerate the employee for his diminished capacity to participate in
the labor marketplace. 9 A workmen's compensation system does
not pretend to make the claimant "whole," as is the purpose of a
tort recovery. Rather, it provides society with a dignified means of
preventing its working wounded from becoming destitute.9" While
the payment of compensation in a Lilly-type fact situation is more
in line with the basic premise of compensation, a much more difficult situation arises when the injury slowly occurs over twenty
years and the claimant is due to retire. The latter situation is not
all that infrequent, as an examination of some statistics from a
jurisdiction where cumulative injuries have been compensated for
some time will reveal.
The California Labor Code9' defines "injury" as including any
injury or disease arising out of employment. In 1968 that section
of the code was further refined to include injuries of a specific or
cumulative nature. 92 The effects of cumulative injury claims on the3
compensation system in California were the subject of a study
conducted by the California Workers' Compensation Institute, an
8.SEvans v. Compensation Director, 150 W. Va. 161, 144 S.E.2d 663 (1965).
111 LARSON, supra note 4, § 2.40.

g Id. § 2.50.
" CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208 (Deering 1976).
" CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208.1 (Deering 1976).

3 CALIFORNIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSTu'rE, CUMuLATWVE INJURY IN CALIFORNIA, A REPORT TO THE INDUSTRY (Sept. 1977) (hereinafter cited as REPORT).
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employer and insurer organization. The study monitored cumulative injury claims during a two-month period in 1977. While some
of the results of the study are not particularly surprising, they do
point to some important problems with the compensation of cumulative injuries. The study notes that the median age of workers
claiming cumulative injuries is fifty-one, compared to a median
age of thirty-three for all claims made by the injured workforce.'"
While this is not unusual considering that cumulative injuries
occur over a protracted period of time, at least one worker in eleven
is retired before claiming compensation.95 Since the median age of
cumulative injury claimants is fifty-one, a large proportion of the
workers filing such claims are in the process of leaving the active
workforce voluntarily through early or regular retirement plans. "
The dollar allocation in cumulative injury claims also points to a
relationship between cumulative injuries and retirement. The normal specific injury claim calls for about 22% of the total dollars
spent to go for lost-time payments, while the figure in cumulative
injury claims is 8%. 7 While almost 40% of the total dollars spent
for specific injuries goes for medical benefits, the figure is more
05
than cut in half in cumulative injury cases-19%.
Additionally,
less than0.2% of the cumulative injury dollar goes to returning the
employee to the workforce through vocational rehabilitation programs. Instead, more than 70% of the cumulative injury claim
dollar goes to compensating the employee for his reduced ability
to compete in the open labor market,9 even though the typical
claimant will soon be leaving that market.
Because cumulative injury claims are not particularly conducive to conventional means of proving compensability, the costs of
delivering compensation are high. About 94% of all cumulative
injury claims are litigated, and attorneys are retained in all but 1%
of those cases."'0 The average payment for cumulative injuries is
$9,218, which is immediately reduced by a median attorney's fee
11Id. at 6.
Id.
Address by Joseph Markey, legislative advocate, California Self-Insurers
Ass'n, Nat'l Conference on Workers' Compensation, Chicago, 111. (July 24, 1978).
Markey noted that 95 percent of California employers have some type of noncontributory pension plan.
11REPoir, supra note 93, at 6.
'

9' Id.

IId.

10Id. at 7. The report indicates that more than two-thirds of California cumulative injury claims are settled by compromise and release agreements.
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of $780. 11The employee receives about 92%102 of the award, but the
litigation costs are substantially increased by the employer's costs,
which often include the cost of the employee's forensic reports as
an addition to the award. The result is a net litigation cost of
$1,950 per claim."°3 The fact that it costs $1,950 to-deliver a net
benefit to the employee of $8,438 results in an overhead factor of
23%.114 This overhead figure does not include the cost of hearing
officers, court reporters, office space, and other items.
The allocation of costs in a cumulative injury claim where an
employee has worked for numerous employers presents another
significant problem for insurers and self-insurers. Prior to the 1978
enactment of California Labor Code § 5500.5,105 the cost of a cumulative injury claim was borne by employers during the most recent
five years of the employee's exposure to the conditions giving rise
to the injury." 6 Once liability was established, the normal methods
of apportionment were used to distribute the costs. However, if an
employee worked for the same employer for more than five years,
the costs were apportioned to all employers exposing the employee
to the conditions precipitating the injury.0 7 Thus an employer,
who thought his liability for a particular employee's compensable
injury was terminated when the employment terminated, discovered that he had an open-ended liability which was never calculated into the experience ratings used by insurers to set premiums.
While the five-year rule was intended to reduce the number of
parties defendant in cumulative injury claims, one-half of the
employees bringing such claims had worked for the same employer
for more than five years, thus rendering the rule effective only 50%
of the time.'
Realizing the ineffectiveness of the five-year rule, the legislature adopted a plan which progressively reduces the period of liability so that by 1981, the costs of a cumulative injury claim will
be borne by employers for whom the employee worked during the
last year of exposure." 9 The effect of this change is basically two't Id.
102

Id.

103Id.
10 Id.

'
'

CAL. LAB. CODE § 5500.5 (Deering Supp. 1978).
CAL. LAB. CODE § 5500.5 (Deering 1976).

107Id.

REPORT, supra note 93, at 9.
,w CAL. LAB. CODE § 5500.5 (Deering Supp. 1978).
''
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fold. It will reduce the number of parties defendant in such claims
and will avoid the problem of paying today's claim with yesterday's dollars, collected at a time when the dimensions and costs
of cumulative injury claims were unknown. This modification,
however effective it may be in helping employers and insurers
calculate costs, does not approach the problem of apportioning
costs so that the rigors of the eight-hour workday are not held
solely responsible for the disabilities caused in part by the normal
conditions of living and aging throughout the remaining sixteen
hours of the workday. To state this more clearly: to what extent
should consumers be expected to pay for the degenerative effects
of, say, arthritis and rheumatism of a 61-year-old employee soon
to leave the workforce voluntarily?"' Another question asked by
some is whether wear and tear associated with employment is already compensated indirectly in the formula used to determine an
employee's wage. While these questions may provoke philosophical
discourse on the underlying purpose of wages, they are rendered
moot by the development of workmen's compensation systems
which compensate employees for degenerative work-related disabilities. The more important question now revolves around methods of separating work-related disabilities from those caused by
the aging process and the other sixteen hours of an employee's day.
While this may more properly be left to medical experts, there are
some things employers can do to reduce the occurrence of cumulative injury claims.
VI.

EMPLOYER PROTECTION: HOLDING THE LINE

Certainly one of the most important steps an employer can
take to limit his compensation liability for cumulative injuries
involves the use of extensive preemployment physicals. One insurance expert suggests that extensive preemployment physicals
with significant documentation as to the amount of disability already existing in an employee at the time of hire serve two essential
purposes.'' When a claim does arise, sufficient evidence will be on
hand to document how much of the disability is work-related.
Secondly, preemployment physicals will single out employees
with existing disabilities so that the employee may be placed on a
job which will not aggravate that disability. Although most employers provide some sort of preemployment physical, those phys110
Address by Robert J. Benjamin, chairman, State Compensation Insurance
Fund, Nat'l Conference on Workers' Compensation, Chicago, Ill. (July 24, 1978).
In

Id.
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icals are, for the most part, inadequate for detecting the sophisticated mental and physical disabilities which may ultimately cost
the employer a great deal. Preemployment physicals do present
some problems, however. An employer has no duty to perform such
physicals, but if he does perform a physical and negligently fails
to discover a disability, he may be held liable." 2 Additionally,
employers subject to the law concerning affirmative action in the
hiring and advancement of the handicapped may find that they
have the burden of justifying their refusal to hire an individual
because of that person's physical condition."'3
Periodic health examinations of current employees also provide a means of detecting trouble before it develops into an industrial disability claim. A ten year old health testing program at
the IBM Corporation uncovered previously undetected illnesses in
one-third of the employees examined. About 50% of the findings
had been previously unknown by the employees, and 1.5% of the
enough to warexaminations produced findings that were serious
14
rant emergency notification of the employees.
Probably the most important and most obvious method of
limiting work-related disability is keeping the work environment
free of hazards and designing jobs which minimize the possibilities
that a disability may result. There are few good excuses for allowing an employee to perform a job which requires him to stretch io
pull a lever when a simple extension of the lever would eliminate
the potentially disabling act. These types of changes in the working environment, along with extensive preemployment and periodic physicals, will do as much to eliminate work-related disabilities and their consequent expenses as will all of the legislative and
judicial struggles now waged by employers trying to limit developing statutory and case law.
Legislative and judicial struggles should in no respect be
abandoned. Questionable claims should always be litigated with
vigor. An employer's legislative clout should never be ignored, especially with respect to the current trend toward coordinating
workmen's compensation benefits with a myriad of other benefits,
such as pensions and social security,'5 to which a vast majority of
American workers are now entitled."
Coffee v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 551, 105 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1972).
41 C.F.R. §§ 60-741.1 to .54 (1978).
t McQuade, Those Annual Physicals Are Worth the Trouble, Foa'rME (Jan.
1977), at 164-173.
",5 An Ohio appellate court recently ruled that employers may deduct from
Il
"
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CONCLUSION

The development of the cumulative injury concept trauma in
the Lilly case freed the West Virginia court from the patently
unworkable rule that an injury had to result from an isolated,
fortuitous event or result. Additionally, Lilly allows the court to
take a more realistic and vigorous approach to the compensation
of injuries formerly considered noncompensable and to this end
may serve as a means of developing a more equitable system of
dealing with injuries in the workplace.
However, the principles championed in Lilly cannot be allowed to develop in a vacuum devoid of the economic and social
realities of contemporary business. For a balanced development of
the Lilly principles to take place, those involved in the compensation system must not lose sight of the underlying principle that
workmen's compensation was conceived to remove the adversarial
system from the industrial environment.
Russell Furbee Ethridge
workers' compensation benefits the amount of any benefits paid for disability from
an employer funded disability income plan or disability pension plan. Green v.
Stringer, No. 1156 (Ct. App. Ohio, 2d Dist., Jan. 13, 1978) (unreported decision).
In addition, the National Workers' Compensation Standards Act, now under consideration by the Senate Committee on Human Resources, contains a provision for
offsetting workers' compensation death benefits against social security benefits,
with certain limitations. S. 3060, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). (Author's Note: Ohio
recently enacted emergency legislation limiting Green v. Springer to temporary
disability plan set-offs.)
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